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In 2001, the Property (Relationships) Amendment Act introduced s 15 Property (Relationships) Act 1976 into New Zealand’s property regime. The purpose of this section was to rebalance any significant economic disparities that existed between the parties’ incomes and living standards as a result of the division of functions in the relationship, and that equal sharing of relationship property would not rectify. Section 15, therefore, was designed to reduce the hardship that equal sharing could produce by recognising the full effects that the partnership had had on parties’ respective earning capacities and, accordingly, place them in a more substantively equal position at the end of their relationship. Yet how far has s 15 achieved its original purpose? To answer this question, this paper examines the scope and operation of this section by reviewing 60 cases that have substantively applied s 15 and also sets out findings from a small-scale qualitative project which interviewed legal practitioners working in this field.
I Section 15 P(R)A: Origins and Aims
Section 15 Property (Relationships) Act 1976 (P(R)A) is a major element of the property settlement regime in New Zealand. Prior to its introduction in 2001, the fundamental objective of this regime, then governed by the Matrimonial Property Act 1976 (MPA), was to achieve equality between the parties on relationship breakdown by dividing the relationship’s core assets into 50:50 shares.​[1]​ This equal sharing rule was applied very strictly: although exceptions existed, equal sharing was in fact very difficult to disapply.​[2]​ While this approach formally reflected the idea of marriage as an equal partnership, the rigid application of this rule was criticised for focusing too heavily on property and disregarding losses or gains made in relation to earning capacity.​[3]​ By overlooking the impact that a relationship could have on earning capacity, critics felt that the MPA was only achieving equality “in name alone”​[4]​ as, in reality, a 50:50 split of relationship property often left drastic economic disparities between the parties’ at the end of the relationship.​[5]​ Although it was possible for claimants to supplement property settlements with spousal support under the Family Proceedings Act 1980 (FPA),​[6]​ maintenance was only granted for needs arising from the marriage and therefore the FPA could not be used on a compensatory basis to rectify the inequality in earning capacities that existed in property settlement.​[7]​ The problems with the MPA’s uncompromising equal sharing rule were evident in the case law, exemplified by Z v Z (No 2),​[8]​ and it was clear that the inability to consider future earning capacity particularly disadvantaged primary caregivers and homemakers who had made career sacrifices in their relationships.​[9]​ This disadvantage, therefore, was typically gendered.
	To rectify these problems, the Property (Relationships) Amendment Act 2001 (P(R)AA) introduced s 15 alongside a series of reforms that significantly altered the MPA regime in a bid to reflect a more holistic conception of partnership.​[10]​ Not only did these substantial changes include renaming the MPA to the P(R)A to encompass a broader range of relationships​[11]​ and strengthening the principle of equal sharing,​[12]​ but the P(R)AA also introduced a new exception to equal sharing. Therefore, the equal division of relationship property is subject to s 14 P(R)A marriages of short duration,​[13]​ s 13 P(R)A extraordinary circumstances that would be repugnant to justice to ignore (both of which had existed under the MPA)​[14]​ and now s 15 P(R)A economic disparity.​[15]​ Section 15 provides the courts with an additional compensatory-based discretion to redress significant economic disparities in the parties’ incomes and living standards likely to arise on relationship breakdown and that equal sharing would not rectify.​[16]​ This means that where successful, a s 15 award will increase the claimant’s 50 per cent share of relationship property to recognise the full effects that the partnership has had on the parties’ respective earning capacities. Thus, this provision was introduced to place the parties in more substantively equal positions on relationship breakdown; namely to equalise the parties’ respective economic positions and opportunities at the end of the relationship to achieve equality in outcome and thereby limit the harsh results that formal equality was producing.​[17]​ In particular, s 15 was designed to protect “primary care-givers in the ‘classic’ scenario where they have sacrificed their career for the sake of raising children, and/or have assumed the homemaker role thus enabling their (typically) husband’s career to flourish”.​[18]​ 
	Yet, 12 years on, how far can this section be said to have relieved the harsh results that equal sharing can bring? Does s 15, in practice, recognise the full effects that a partnership can have on the parties’ respective earning capacities and has it achieved greater substantive equality between the parties on relationship breakdown through its compensatory-based design? To answer these questions and to evaluate the effectiveness of this provision, I will examine the scope of s 15 by reviewing 60 cases that have used this section; explore how awards are quantified; and finally set out findings from a qualitative project where I interviewed legal practitioners in this field. By reflecting on these insights, this article considers how effectively s 15 is compensating relationship-generated disparities and whether this compensatory approach achieves substantive equality between the parties’ economic positions on relationship breakdown.
II The Application of Section 15
A The Scope of Section 15
Unfortunately, the drafting of s 15 has significantly restricted the application and scope of this compensatory-based discretion. To use s 15, claimants must show that their claim falls within the jurisdictional scope of this provision. They must demonstrate first, that a significant economic disparity in income and standard of living is likely to exist between the parties and second, that this disparity is the result of a division of functions in the relationship. To facilitate the discussion in this section, this paper has reviewed all cases that substantively discussed s 15 accessed through the LinxPlus database.​[19]​ Altogether 60 cases were reviewed; three from the Court of Appeal, 14 from the High Court and 43 from the Family Court. Only six of the s 15 applicants were male, demonstrating the highly gendered nature of this provision.​[20]​ Of these, 26 cases successfully established a s 15 claim while 34 did not: 23 cases failed to establish a ‘significant disparity’ and 29 failed to establish a causal link between the disparity and the division of functions within the relationship. While the sample is small and therefore only limited conclusions can be made from this analysis, it is possible to draw some inferences on how s 15’s machinery has operated so far.
1 Jurisdictional hurdles: significant disparities
In practice, problems have arisen as a result of these jurisdictional hurdles. Section 15 requires a significant disparity in both ‘income’ and (rather than ‘or’) ‘standard of living’.​[21]​ While the courts have recognised that an income disparity may indicate a disparity in living standards,​[22]​ this is not guaranteed and therefore the presumption is that both of these factors exist independently of each other.​[23]​ Furthermore, the disparity between the parties must be significant, that is to say it must be a disparity “that will have a material impact on the life of one party”.​[24]​ While ‘significant’ is left undefined by the Act, the courts have recognised that ‘significant’ may have a different meaning in low income cases.​[25]​ Therefore a $20,000 difference in income may be considered significant where parties are earning $40,000 and $60,000 respectively, but this may not be so where parties are earning $980,000 and $1 million respectively: “… [i]n the latter case, the disparity is overwhelmed by the total income available to each party”.​[26]​ Crossing this jurisdictional hurdle should therefore be as possible in small money cases as in large money cases.   
However, after reviewing the cases that substantively applied s 15, it seems harder for small money cases to successfully establish a ‘significant disparity’. All 60 cases were grouped first by their income brackets and second by the size of the pool of relationship property where possible.​[27]​ As figure 1 demonstrates, lower income cases were generally less likely to cross the jurisdictional threshold. While a ‘significant disparity’ was found in both the parties’ incomes and living standards in 83 per cent of cases in the ‘over $100,000’ income bracket, only 38 per cent of cases with incomes under $100,000 successfully did so with only one case, B v B,​[28]​ falling in the ‘under $50,000’ bracket. Here the Court considered the income difference between incomes of $37,000 and $45,000 to be significantly disparate. Yet, lower income cases are generally less likely to establish a significant disparity and the courts have rejected similar claims for example where the parties’ incomes were $26,000 and $18,000 respectively and also $35,000 and $48,000.​[29]​ In fact, despite the Court in B v B recognising that in small money cases, $5,000 could amount to a significant disparity in income and living standards,​[30]​ only two cases in the lower two income brackets successfully established a significant disparity where the income differential was less than $40,000​[31]​ and in most of the successful cases, respondents were earning at least twice as much as the claimants. Therefore, even though the courts have recognised ‘significant’ means something different in small income cases, the smaller the disparity, the less likely the case will cross this jurisdictional hurdle.




Furthermore, in the absence of a statutory definition of ‘significant’, there is a lack of consistency in what the courts will classify as being significant or insignificant. While a $1 million disparity between incomes of $100,000 and $1.1 million may be considered significant in most courts, the courts may differ in opinion where the disparities are small: one court may find a $10,000 difference between incomes of $86,000 and $76,000 to be significant, while another may not.​[32]​ Consequently, the application of s 15 is less certain and more complicated in lower income cases where there are more likely to be smaller disparities. Similarly, as figure 2 below demonstrates, larger pools of relationship property were also more likely to cross the jurisdictional threshold. However, this difference was slight: 67 per cent of cases involving assets totaling over $1million crossed this jurisdictional hurdle in comparison to 50 per cent of cases with relationship assets totaling less than $500,000. 
Figure 2: The Relationship between Relationship Property and Finding a ‘Significant Disparity’
  
Thus, a ‘significant disparity’ is less likely to be found in small asset/low income cases even though these smaller disparities are likely to have a significant material impact on the financially weaker party’s economic position in the long run. Section 15 seems skewed towards compensating claimants in wealthier cases that are more likely to have greater disposable assets and higher incomes. This also suggests that s 15 does not protect the most economically vulnerable claimants post-separation (even if they are in the ‘classic’ homemaker/breadwinner scenario) who require additional economic support: 50 per cent of a small pool of relationship property is less likely to meet needs in comparison to a large pool. 
	Instead and only if possible, claimants who cannot cross s 15’s hurdles will have to seek spousal support separately to supplement property settlement under either s 63 FPA which provides maintenance during the marriage or civil union or s 64 FPA which provides maintenance where the marriage or civil union is dissolved, or where the parties to a de facto relationship cease to live together.​[33]​ Maintenance awards under the FPA are an independent matter from property settlement​[34]​ and allow the courts to order periodical payments to help meet the payee’s ‘reasonable needs’ if they ‘cannot practicably meet the whole or any part of those needs.’ These needs must arise due to certain circumstances which slightly differ between ss 63 and 64. The circumstances set out in s 63(2) include the applicant’s ability to become self-supporting;​[35]​ ongoing childcare responsibilities; any physical or mental disability; any inability to obtain work; standard of living and any retraining or period of education to increase the payee’s earning capacity that would be unfair for them to bear the cost.​[36]​ Section 64’s list is slightly shorter as it omits needs which arise from unemployment or disability.​[37]​ However, while the FPA might reduce some of the hardship of formal equality, this remedy is needs-based and therefore the goal of such awards is not to level the economic playing field between the parties.​[38]​ Maintenance does not fill the conceptual gap left by the narrow drafting of s 15 and therefore these claimants will not have their economic positions levelled with their former partner’s as an entitlement; the harsh consequences of equality can continue to exist. 
2 Jurisdictional hurdles: causation
The second jurisdictional hurdle in s 15 is that the significant disparity must be relationship-generated and altogether 26 out of 60 cases established a causal link, while 29 did not.​[39]​ Although the approach under this step is to redress only prospective economic disparity,​[40]​ the basis of a s 15 award is retrospective, looking at the effects of the parties’ past roles in the relationship and whether the division of relationship functions has depressed the claimant’s earning capacity and/or enhanced the respondent’s earning capacity.​[41]​ This causal requirement between economic disparity and past relationship functions is fundamental to s 15; without it a claim will fail.​[42]​ Yet this does not mean that the division of functions has to be the principal cause of the disparity. For example, if party A has an exceedingly high income which is mainly attributable to his own skill, party B can still establish a causal link if their domestic contribution allowed party A to make the most of their career opportunities.​[43]​ Section 15 has provided some relief from formal equality by recognising these sorts of economic disparities at the end of a relationship.​[44]​ 
However, there are fundamental evidential problems with this component of s 15 when establishing that an ‘enhancement’ was the result of the division of functions within the relationship rather than just down to the party B’s own ability, or where party A had also been employed full-time.​[45]​ In this latter scenario, it is unlikely that she will be able to establish that the division of functions has helped “free up her partner’s time and energy”​[46]​ so that he can focus on his career when she has been out of the house herself even if she had been largely responsible for primary caregiving as well.​[47]​ This evidential task becomes even harder once again in small money cases as it is far easier to show that party B has enhanced party A’s earning potential where party A has an exceedingly high income in comparison to a relatively small salary: it is harder to prove that party A’s ‘small’ income is due to the fact that party B’s domestic role allowed them to make the most of their career opportunities as a small income is arguably less likely to have had such notable opportunities. Consequently, of the 15 cases that successfully established an ‘enhancement’, 12 respondents earned over $100,000 per annum; three respondents earned between $50,000 and $100,000; and none earned ‘under $50,000’. 
It is also difficult to establish a ‘depression’; where a claimant’s low income is the direct consequence of the division of functions in the relationship unless there is a very tangible impact. Twelve out of the 23 cases which successfully did so based this on physical evidence where either the respondent had been absent from the household for prolonged periods of time overseas due to employment​[48]​ or where the claimant had frequently moved (most typically abroad) to support the respondent’s career path.​[49]​ Similarly, a causal link was found in eight cases where the claimant had given up a professional career in areas such as teaching, architecture and IT.​[50]​ Yet, it becomes far more difficult where the claimant’s income was low either because they were at the start of a career, or because their labour was unskilled: 11 out of 29 cases failed to find such a link on this particular point. For example in CRH v GDH (a 34 year marriage) both parties had married as teenagers when she became pregnant with their first child.​[51]​ Mr. H had trained as an electrician while Mrs. H had been the primary caregiver for their three children, had no career to speak of and was working in unskilled, part-time work upon separation. The Court failed to find that the division of functions had caused her low earning capacity stating that:​[52]​
She had never developed a career in her teenage years because she had insufficient time. It is therefore very difficult for her to show that there is a detrimental effect on a career development because she did not have one in which to develop.
In these scenarios, the courts are often unwilling to ‘speculate’ on careers leaving such claimants in vulnerable positions on relationship breakdown.​[53]​ Moreover, in the case of unskilled labour, low income may be attributed to that party’s lack of skill, training or even their lack of ambition rather than because of the relationship itself.​[54]​ Providing evidence to show that the party’s low income is a direct result of the relationship is likely to be difficult for many claimants even though these claimants are more likely to suffer economically in the long term as they are unable to return to a previously lucrative or skilled career. 
Therefore, it is difficult to prove a s 15 causal link unless very particular circumstances exist for example where there has been some global relocating, a sacrifice of a professional career or by staying at home to enable the respondent to make the most of notable career opportunities. These scenarios, however, are once again skewed towards relationships with high incomes and professional careers rather than run-of-the-mill cases. As a result of all these difficulties that make it harder for small money cases to cross s 15’s jurisdictional hurdles, the section seems to have an asymmetrical application of property settlement where compensation is primarily available in practice in the context of large money cases. In contrast, small money cases which are harder to prove must typically rely only on a 50:50 split of assets and therefore property settlement often ignores the full economic effects that a partnership can have in these cases. Instead, and only if possible, these claimants must rely on the needs-based provisions under the FPA to remedy the harsh consequences of formal equality but this will not guarantee that the playing field is levelled. Thus, a number of economically vulnerable individuals are excluded from using s 15 to rebalance economic inequalities or to compensate the party for the effects that their partnership has had on their earning capacity. These claimants are left to contend with the hardship of formal equality and, given the high number of female applicants in the sample, this disadvantage is a gendered one. 
	While the difficulty crossing both of these jurisdictional hurdles prevents s 15 from actually compensating individuals in typically small money cases, the very policy of s 15 also limits how far this section can really be used to achieve substantive economic equality between the parties on relationship breakdown: s 15 does not rebalance just any economic disparity between the parties, it must be relationship-generated. As the Court in Chong v Speller stressed, s 15 was not introduced to give the courts discretion to redress all economic disparities, nor to achieve generalised social justice or gender equality objectives.​[55]​ Therefore, where the economic disparity is caused by external factors such as age, ill health or incompetence rather than the relationship, the section will not apply​[56]​ and eight cases under review in this study failed on such external factors.​[57]​ Consequently, if a party is unable to work due to an injury or a disability for example, s 15 does not provide them with a remedy to ensure that they are protected from any financial hardship that will follow formal equality as it will not level the economic playing field between the parties.​[58]​ Moreover, as this section is retrospective in its focus, it will not consider future economic disparities. As Miles points out, this may mean that women who are pregnant for the first time at the end of the relationship and have not yet had to assume child-care activities will not be able to use s 15.​[59]​ 
	However, this ‘causal’ requirement suggests that where ‘individual’ factors create an economic imbalance, claimants are in some way more accountable (or at least respondents are less so) for their economic plight. Such claimants are not ‘entitled’ to substantive equality and rather they must pursue a s 63 or s 64 FPA remedy if possible which will only meet their reasonable needs rather than rebalance the parties’ economic positions. Yet, it seems somewhat unfair to effectively penalise individuals for circumstances that are as much beyond their control as their spouses. Furthermore, by excluding such factors from property settlement, s 15, and thus the P(R)A, ignores a fundamental aspect of a partnership: mutual support and financial interdependency.​[60]​ Arguably, when individuals enter a relationship, they form a mutual agreement to support one another in the face of such common life vicissitudes, and therefore these external factors do not just impact upon individuals in the relationship. Rather, the whole relationship will move and adapt in response to these changes and the financially stronger partner will inevitably take some responsibility over the financial weakness of the other partner. However, s 15 does not recognise this economic consequence of a relationship and therefore the scope of this section does not extend the concept of ‘partnership’ as far as it could within the P(R)A. 
B Quantification
Not only have there been difficulties in relation to s 15’s machinery that hinder the application of this compensatory-based discretion particularly in small money cases, but once past these jurisdictional hurdles, the process of quantifying awards has also created problems that limit the extent through which s 15 can be said to achieve substantive equality in practice. First, s 15 has been criticised for introducing too much uncertainty into the property settlement regime. When making s 15 awards, the courts can consider the likely earning capacity of each spouse, any on-going childcare responsibilities and any other relevant factors.​[61]​ However, other than these considerations, s 15 does not actually state how an economic disparity should be quantified, thus introducing wide discretion into the P(R)A. While the courts have rejected the argument that this means s 15 has unfettered discretion,​[62]​ they have also been reluctant to impose a rigid formula for quantification.​[63]​ As a result, several cases have discussed this issue and used ‘wildly’ different approaches to quantify economic disparity.​[64]​ Heidi Gray, for example, draws upon three dissimilar approaches within the courts:​[65]​ first, some courts will focus on redressing the claimant’s loss of earning capacity. The Court in B v M deducted the claimant’s current earning capacity from the income that she would have earned but for the division of relationship functions.​[66]​ The Court then multiplied this figure by the number of years it would take the claimant to reach that full capacity. Second, other courts measure the economic disparity by considering the overall impact that the division of relationship functions has had on both spouses, including the economic enhancement that the respondent has received as a result of the relationship. For example, in H v H (No. 2) the Court calculated what the net earning capacity of both parties would have been if all the household responsibilities had been shared equally and if both parties had remained working.​[67]​ The Court then deducted this figure from the parties’ current net earning capacity and then finally halved this sum.​[68]​ Another third approach, since rejected in M v B,​[69]​ was to calculate the difference between the two parties’ earning capacities.​[70]​ All three of these approaches could produce vastly different outcomes on similar case facts.
	Thus, there is no set method of quantification for s 15 and although the Court of Appeal has approved the first of the approaches mentioned above in the landmark case X v X,​[71]​ it also warned against having one “rote formula” for quantifying s 15 awards.​[72]​ The courts, in the absence of guidance, are instead left to use the approach that they believe is the most appropriate given the case facts. This wide flexibility ensures that awards can be tailored to each individual case to achieve greater substantive equality by recognising economic disparity in a variety of ways. However, critics have argued that s 15 in practice “flout[s] s 1N(d)” which stipulates that settlements should be resolved as inexpensively, simply, and speedily as is consistent with justice as it “introduces great uncertainty into the Act”.​[73]​ Thus, commentators have viewed s 15 as being inconsistent with the goals of a community of property regime.​[74]​ Furthermore, even after the court has calculated the economic disparity, it can also make contingency deductions to take account of the fact that the future is uncertain. Yet, the size of and the reasoning behind these deductions are often unclear, illogical and vary inconsistently between cases​[75]​ and this has further contributed to the uncertainty that s 15 has brought to the P(R)A. Therefore, rather than achieving greater substantive equality amongst the parties, the wide flexibility contained within s 15 has potentially weakened the procedural justice that a community of property regime provides: it has led to excessive and inconsistent litigation which has diluted certainty, lengthened proceedings and has increased parties’ costs. Arguably then, parties are more disadvantaged than helped by the provision in practice. Even the courts themselves have criticised the lack of statutory guidance in relation to quantification; the Court in P v P (2005) stated that “the absence of any meaningful guidance in s 15 ‘was remarkable’”.​[76]​ More direction is needed and desired on what s 15’s objective should be.​[77]​
	The second problem regarding quantification is that the courts have seemingly developed a restrictive approach which has been criticised for producing ineffectual awards. Therefore, despite the wide discretion available in s 15, it is questionable how far this compensatory provision can be said to successfully rebalance the parties’ economic positions post-separation. The case of X v X  exemplifies this point. In X v X, (a marriage of 21 years) both parties had gained accountancy degrees and the wife had excelled at her studies and had a job at a major accounting firm, so both parties started off their careers at equal levels.​[78]​ Mrs. X subsequently gave up her job to raise their children, and at the time of separation, their relationship property amounted to $7.5 million; Mr. X was earning $1.5 million annually while Mrs. X was only expected to achieve up to $65,000 per annum. The Court calculated it would take Mrs. X 18 years before her ‘actual’ income would equate the income she would have received ‘but for’ her career sacrifice. However, rather than produce an award which reflected 18 years of economic disparity, the Court halved the award ‘for the contingency that she might not have earned this ‘but for’ income’ even if she had stayed in employment,​[79]​ and instead the Court calculated that the s 15 adjustment should be an additional seven per cent of the relationship property. After calculating this economic disparity, X v X also settled much academic debate and inconsistent case law by confirming that the Court’s final step is to then halve this figure.​[80]​ This, the Court reasoned, was to account for the fact that the division of relationship responsibilities was a joint decision reached by the couple, and thus the responsibility for this career sacrifice should be borne by both parties.​[81]​ Consequently, rather than adding Mrs. X’s additional seven per cent to her already 50 per cent share, it was ‘shared’ between the parties. Therefore, Mrs. X received just under 53.5 per cent of relationship property which worked out as an additional $240,000. 
	However, given that the Court in X v X declared that this case was the archetypal case that s 15 had been designed for, the size of Mrs. X’s award is particularly disappointing as $240,000 only equates to roughly one sixth of the figure that Mr. X was earning annually. Not only does this not actually reflect the income that Mrs. X has lost from her career sacrifice, but a disparity in the income and standard of living remains between Mr. and Mrs. X. Furthermore, it is likely that this disparity will increase substantially in the long-term given that Mr. X’s income also means that he will recover financially from this separation at a far quicker rate than Mrs. X who will have to rebuild her career given the amount of time that she has been out of the work force, and she may in fact never reach her predicted income.​[82]​ While the original aim of s 15 was to achieve substantive equality on relationship breakdown by redressing economic disparities, it is unlikely that the sum awarded in this case will achieve such results: the courts have clearly developed a restrictive approach whereby these deductions reduce awards to such sizes that they barely compensate claimants at all for lost income, let alone rebalance the parties’ economic positions.​[83]​ Thus, the s 15 adjustment in X v X appears to be a bare minimum compensatory award and if this unsatisfactory outcome is being achieved in a model scenario that s 15 was ‘designed for’, then it appears that s 15 has in fact failed to redress inequalities on relationship breakdown and therefore the hardships that equal sharing can produce.​[84]​ 
	This inability to achieve substantive equality on relationship breakdown may be attributable not only to the courts’ narrow application of s 15’s discretion, but also to the actual design of s 15. Even if the courts’ approach towards quantification was more generous, there is an inevitable cap on awards: s 15 only allows adjustments to be made by lump sums or property transfers (and not periodical payments) which enables a clean break post-separation, and s 15(3) also provides that adjustments can only be granted from relationship property and therefore not separate property. Consequently, the asset pool available for adjustments is significantly limited and most problematically excludes future income as a source for compensation.​[85]​ Not only does this limitation generally restrict the possible size of awards, but it also detrimentally impacts small asset cases where there may be limited relationship property to share anyway.​[86]​ Where there is an insignificant amount of relationship property, in reality, the breadwinner’s income may be the only possible source through which to make an effective s 15 adjustment. Yet, because s 8 P(R)A does not include income in the definition of relationship property, once again, it may be harder for small asset cases who manage to cross s 15’s jurisdictional hurdles to receive a reward that actually redresses economic disparity. Such asymmetry between small and large cases therefore persists in s 15. Arguably, s 15 is too narrowly framed to fully achieve substantive equality between the parties’ economic positions.
More alarmingly, the machinery of s 15 may actually prevent awards from actually meeting the section’s compensatory objectives, let alone from achieving substantive equality. Critics have argued that Mrs. X’s award is unlikely to have even covered her legal expenses and therefore her final settlement and her economic prospects post separation remained significantly lower than her former spouse’s.​[87]​ This worrying trend is present in other cases, such as M v B where Stephanie Pettigrew has argued that the $75,000 awarded to the wife was likely to have been lost in the legal costs and also the costs required to have expert witnesses calculate the economic disparity.​[88]​ This article has already highlighted the difficulty associated with proving such disparities necessary in order to operate s 15’s machinery. Furthermore, to effectively prove ‘likely disparities’ and ‘but for’ incomes in court requires expert witnesses and this will inevitably add to the parties’ costs in addition to court fees and legal bills. This means that the financially weaker party remains in a very precarious position post-separation, and therefore the straitjacket effect of equal capital division remains. It is somewhat ironic that a s 15 award may barely cover the legal expense that is necessary to bring a s 15 claim to court, and such modest awards could act as a deterrent for those wishing and needing to use this provision particularly in small money cases where there are little funds readily available for such costs. The positive result may be that claimants are encouraged to settle outside of court and tentative research has suggested that s 15 may make more of an impact in cases that settle.​[89]​ However, these modest awards reached in court may also alter the balance of power in out of court negotiations to the disadvantage of the financially weaker party. If there is little financial utility in going to court to pursue a s 15 award, then claimants could be forced to accept far lower sums of compensation than they would be entitled to in the courts to avoid having this sum completely absorbed by legal costs. Such a narrow approach to quantification prevents s 15 awards from achieving the section’s compensatory objective and could therefore affect how far substantive equality is being achieved both inside and outside of court.
	III The Daily Realities of Section 15
The depiction of s 15 so far does not include the everyday case under this property regime: the few cases that reach the higher courts are likely to differ from the majority of cases, which do not reach the courts. Furthermore, s 15 awards may be more effective in cases that do not reach the higher courts given that legal costs are likely to be substantially lower. Therefore, without some insight into how this section operates on the ground, it is difficult to fully understand the impact of s 15 in practice. To remedy this absence, this part of the article presents a selection of findings from an empirical study which examined practitioners’ experiences of New Zealand’s property regime. 
	This study conducted between April and July 2010 explored the day-to-day running of New Zealand’s system through 16 telephone interviews (lasting between 45 minutes and an hour) with family lawyers practising in this field from various locations around New Zealand. Prior to carrying out the interviews, ethical approval was sought from the University of Exeter’s Ethics Committee.​[90]​ The lawyers were selected through a number of methods; namely contacting individual members of organisations such as the New Zealand Law Society; contacting key legal firms; and by respondents suggesting other individuals who would be willing to take part in the project. This was a small-scale study (which fed into a larger comparative study),​[91]​ yet the size is still appropriate for a qualitative project of this nature.​[92]​ While the sample may not represent the composition of the legal profession in New Zealand, it offers some insight into the practical operation of this system and how effectively this compensatory approach to property settlement works in reality. Most of the respondents had practised for over 11 years, meaning that the majority were able to recall how New Zealand had operated before the 2001 amendments. This ability to compare the systems before and after 2001 allowed for greater reflection over the efficacy of the current law. 
	In particular, this project looked at the way in which New Zealand treated domestic contributions on relationship breakdown and thus the empirical phase explored how satisfied the lawyers were with the approach taken towards the caregiving/homemaking role. The interviews were structured:​[93]​ a number of questions were posed to the respondents which centred on their opinions of the principles guiding the courts when dividing assets on relationship breakdown in property settlement. However, respondents had ample room to expand upon their answers with free-form comments and these qualitative comments form the basis of this section. To consider the impact of New Zealand’s property regime in varying contexts, the interview schedule tested a number of variables, such as different divisions of labour, different lengths of relationship and the presence or absence of children. The data collected from this study was analysed using a thematic analysis according to the six step process suggested by Braun and Clarke.​[94]​ The project’s overarching aim was to get an in-depth picture of how ‘successfully’ the system approached domestic contributions at the end of the relationship, measured by the lawyers’ satisfaction with property settlement. However, while this study was conducted after X v X,​[95]​ the participants were not directly asked about the effects of this case.
	Generally, the lawyers were very positive about the overall operation and process of property settlement in New Zealand. At the heart of this was the theme that ‘equality equates to certainty’ and therefore predictability. The lawyers identified that the fundamental benefit associated with a starting point of equality was ‘simplicity’: the system is easy for legal practitioners to apply and also for the general public to understand. Consequently, some of the participants emphasised that individuals were aware of their financial entitlements on separation: 
So when people enter relationships, they know what the outcome’s going to be if they separate. And people very quickly adapt to it. (Practitioner 9)
The interviews also indicated that one consequence of this simple system may be to encourage out-of-court settlements. The practitioners suggested that most cases were settled outside court and they were very content with this outcome as less litigation also means lower costs and rapid family dispute settlements: the starting point of equality avoids the high amounts of litigation that the lawyers felt too much flexibility could bring:
… [by valuing] contributions to a relationship [as] prima facie equal [New Zealand’s approach] is working extremely well. It’s avoiding huge amounts of litigation ... and vast cost … it’s a good thing ... (Practitioner 9)
This rule-based approach obviously reflects s 1N(d)’s principle that a system of property settlement should be clear, predictable and certain and the majority of the interviewees stated that the one-size-fits-most approach generally produced fair outcomes:
The regime that we have on the face of it can be very fair … I think it works very well for the majority of people … (Practitioner 4)
The lawyers were extremely satisfied that procedural fairness was being attained. These benefits were also connected to the theme ‘equality avoids evaluation’: dividing assets equally prevents the courts/parties settling out-of-court from having to value the contributions that either party has made. Such a task was considered impossible and would inevitably lead to the homemaker’s contributions being devalued and would result in more litigation. Therefore, equal sharing made sure that:
… the homemaker doesn’t start … with a disadvantage … (Practitioner 11)
Furthermore, practitioners believed that equal division in property settlement was necessary to reflect the fact that the relationship was a ‘partnership’:
 … because it’s a partnership; whatever you contribute in your relationship should count equally. (Practitioner 1) 
Overall, 12 of the 16 lawyers indicated overall satisfaction with their system and there was a stark sense of realism here; the participants recognised that while there was room for improvement, overall the system worked as well as it could in practice:
… it works as best it can and I guess the reality is that … there’s no perfect solution financially in trying to divide a whole into a half … (Practitioner 7)
This focus on certainty and the benefits of a rule-based system is not to say that the lawyers overlooked the discretion present in the system. Nearly half of the respondents felt that New Zealand has a good level of discretion which takes account of relationships where one-size-does-not-fit-all, using ss 13-15 P(R)A to depart from equal sharing. Thus, the respondents were not as worried as earlier critics were about whether s 15 diluted a community of property approach. Rather, they criticised the practical application of this discretion and generally the lawyers felt that there was insufficient flexibility in the property settlement regime which could create ‘insufficient substantive fairness’:
… generally, it’s fair, but … because it’s one-size-fits-all it can create an enormous unfairness. (Practitioner 2) 
Most notably, the respondents heavily criticised s 15 (economic disparity) for failing to alleviate the harshness of equality, and these criticisms from lawyers who worked with ‘ordinary’ cases mirrored the concerns that have arisen in relation to the cases that have reached the higher courts. The lawyers felt that s 15 failed to recognise the future economic impact of the homemaking role. Many of the lawyers were also concerned that s 15 only really compensates someone for a career loss, and therefore is limited to those who had clear potential for a high flying career:
... some of the cases talk about a career break … that’s fine if you’re talking about a homemaker who has a university degree and was a professional whatever. But, you know, that’s only three per cent of the population … (Practitioner 13)
Yet, a large proportion of the lawyers also indicated that there were evidential difficulties present:
… it’s really hard to prove a career break because it’s really hard to get any evidence about what the career would have been. And … in practice the economic disparity provisions haven’t worked out as I believe … the people who came up with them first envisaged … (Practitioner 13)
Additionally, the lawyers indicated that requiring a disparity in both income and standard of living created an additional hurdle:
… she’s got to prove that … the husband’s income and living standards could be significantly higher than hers and that’s come about because of … the functions … each has assumed in the relationship. And her functions might have been [that] she gave up her job as a lawyer and he stayed working as a lawyer and he’s a partner of a firm and she’s starting off as a solicitor at the end of the relationship … and that’s not the end of it, because he might say ‘you’re still earning a, you know, good income as a senior solicitor in the firm in the future and you can’t tell me that … my living standards are significantly higher than yours because you’re off on those trips, the kids are off your hands and, okay my income’s bigger than yours by 10 times or whatever, but, not the living standards because, you know, a big jump over this hurdle is pretty hard. (Practitioner 12)
In practice, the lawyers indicated that it was extremely difficult to depart from equality as the hurdles that needed to be crossed before a claimant could use s 15 were set too high:
We have got s 15 which does give some compensation, but the test is harder to satisfy, and therefore … the disadvantage … isn’t really going to be adequately compensated. (Practitioner 4)
This high bar means that the practitioners felt the section failed to alleviate the harshness of equality as the scope of the provision was too narrow: the significant difficulties attached to proving the jurisdictional requirements of s 15 unfortunately limited the potential application of this compensatory provision.
	Where s 15 was successfully used, the majority of practitioners thought the awards were too modest and therefore did not effectively compensate claimants. Practitioner 16 described the awards as “relatively modest and usually it’s not worth the effort” and Practitioner 13 described them as “negligible”. Therefore the legal costs incurred through litigating are likely to outweigh any award achieved under s 15 and may act as a deterrent on potential claimants. Aside from the cost of the lawyer’s fees, since 2012 claimants also have to pay $700 for applying for a relationship property order and a subsequent $906 for every half day (three hours) if the case is heard in the district court.​[96]​ As one practitioner put it: “you’d be silly going to court, it’s too expensive”. As a result of this, there is the danger that the economically weaker spouse will settle for equal sharing owing to his or her financial inability to access the court system:
… the court does make provision under s 15 … but to actually initiate litigation in New Zealand under the P(R)A is very expensive, so … it has to be a very big asset pool to justify initiating the application, and that is a big barrier in itself … the awards [that] have been given by the courts have been relatively modest and usually it’s not worth the effort. (Practitioner 16)
Most worryingly, the lawyers stated that the disadvantage suffered from the limited use of discretion was in fact a gendered disadvantage as it was typically women who would apply under s 15. Therefore, the harsh consequences continue to flow from formal equality and the 50 per cent limit places usually women in economically weaker positions:
… I think there are these [financial] barriers for um women going to court. (Practitioner 16) 
You’ve got to prove ... the economic disparity at the end of the marriage and 99 per cent of the time it’s a woman, and she’s got to prove that. (Practitioner 12)
Furthermore, the lawyers emphasised that New Zealand’s approach to property settlement was insufficient in cases with small assets:
I do think that the New Zealand system works fine to protect the non-earning spouse where there are high incomes. Where there are not it doesn’t …. (Practitioner 8)
The lawyers were evidently concerned that the section did not contain enough discretion and therefore the P(R)A focused too much on formal equality with little room for maneuver:
The issue in NZ is that the … court really doesn’t have a lot of discretion; it’s equal sharing. It’s almost like it’s the Holy Grail ... (Practitioner 13)
Yet, the lawyers’ dissatisfaction with these provisions was not only due to the P(R)A’s statutory framework but also to the judges’ modest application of this discretion: 
… compensatory awards have been very modestly made and conservatively interpreted. (Practitioner 10)
However, the qualitative project reported in this article did not focus on the FPA remedies and therefore the data is limited in the insight that it can provide overall on New Zealand’s law of financial provision and how far the FPA ‘steps in’ where s 15 falls short. Nevertheless, these findings provide some insight into property settlement and the operation of s 15 and it is evident that, while the lawyers are generally satisfied with the approach in New Zealand, not enough flexibility exists within the regime. Furthermore, the lawyers clearly felt that both the courts and the jurisdictional threshold for s 15 imposed restrictions which limited the effectiveness of this section especially for small asset cases. Therefore, the concerns associated with s 15 seem to apply in both the average day-to-day cases as well as the larger cases that reach the courts. Moreover, these empirical criticisms correspond with some of Claire Green’s tentative Ph.D. findings that lawyers perceived s 15’s difficulties to be:
a)	difficulties in determining whether the cause of the disparity of income and living standards was as a result of the division of functions in the relationship; 
b)	similar difficulties in determining the appropriate amount of compensation; 
c)	issues posed in situations where the economically disadvantaged person has not had a career (so there is no benchmark to compare what the person’s income might have been but for the relationship); 
d)	the high legal costs of advancing a section 15 claim; and 
e)	variation in judicial attitudes towards section 15 claims.​[97]​
IV Conclusion: Reflections on Section 15
While the original aim of this provision was to enable fairer results in property settlement by rebalancing economic disparities, in reality, s 15 has proved to be somewhat of a disappointment in terms of both its scope and the application of its discretion. The empirical results and the earlier analysis in this article demonstrate that there are significant problems with s 15’s machinery that have prevented s 15 from meeting its own objective: to compensate for disparities arising from the relationship. The evidential difficulties faced in trying to cross the jurisdictional hurdles makes it extraordinarily difficult for many cases to actually use the section and frequently limits s 15 to large money cases where partners either have or have sacrificed professional careers: s 15 appears to be a provision for wealthier households. Therefore, this section is less likely to neither relieve the hardship of equality nor reflect the full effect of a partnership in cases which typically involve small money cases. Instead and only if possible, the claimant must separately pursue a maintenance award through the FPA where they are constructed as a ‘needy’ rather than an ‘entitled’ applicant. This means that, even if the FPA meets the claimant’s ‘reasonable needs,’ these individuals may still be left in a comparatively worse financial position than their partners (particularly in the long-term) as their economic positions will not necessarily be rebalanced. 
	Furthermore, the cost of using this section hinders s 15’s ability to meet its own objective. Even where s 15 does apply and there is a chance of compensating economic disparities caused by the relationship, there is an extremely restrictive application of the discretion contained within the section. The result is that legal expenses are barely covered and the lawyers also agreed that such costs were deterring individuals from actually using this section. Consequently, where the courts grant awards, the final figure does not actually seem to compensate claimants for losses that they have incurred as a result of sacrificing their careers. In fact, given that legal costs are likely to absorb most of the award, s 15 settlements seem to have very little to no positive economic effect for the claimant at all. Although further research is needed to see the impact that this is having on cases settled outside of court, such an approach to s 15 may have a negative impact on the bargaining power of claimants wishing to avoid the courts.
	While s 15’s machinery problems hinder its compensatory objective, this section also fails to meet its original aims as neither protects the economically vulnerable nor achieve substantive economic equality. The most economically vulnerable claimants in small money cases are unlikely to be able to establish/afford a s15 claim and even where awards are granted these fail to equalise the parties’ respective economic positions and opportunities at the end of the relationship; these disparities can only be relationship-generated and quantification is overly restrictive. Yet, perhaps s 15 was inevitably going to disappoint as some of these difficulties may not just be particular to this provision but rather attributable to the very policy of s 15. These problems may translate into more general problems associated with having evidence-based compensation as a basis for financial provision: other jurisdictions have also struggled to effectively measure relationship-generated loss.​[98]​ Where a broad compensatory principle with little guidance on how to quantify awards similarly exists in other jurisdictions, e.g. Scotland’s de facto relationship regime,​[99]​ their courts have also produced wildly different approaches to such provisions that have led to inconsistent and uncertain results. Even the principle of compensation that currently exists in England and Wales’ law of financial provision on divorce is largely unused bar in cases involving exceptionally large assets.​[100]​ Then, will relationship-generated loss ever be measurable and if so, where it is evidence-based will it always be limited to cases involving larger assets or claimants who have sacrificed prosperous careers? Perhaps the very formulation of compensation that exists within s 15 is inherently problematic and inappropriately designed to enable the P(R)A to fully achieve substantive economic equality between the parties on relationship breakdown.
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